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NOTES
DORRANCE'S ESTATE:' CONFLICTING ADJUDICATIONS OF DoMIcIL-What

are the rights and duties of an individual over whom two or more states assert
their sovereignty? Shall we adhere to the traditional doctrine that a man can
owe allegiance to, but one sovereign at one time (and is therefore immune from
the incidents of fealty to all others), or shall we depart from such doctrine, on
the ground that modem society not only permits, but actually requires multiple
allegiance? This hypothetical situation becomes a painfully acute reality under
some circumstances, as for example when the fiscal agents of competing states,
eager to replenish depleted treasuries, hail a potential taxpayer as a domiciliary,
and levy upon him the tribute which a domiciliary owes his sovereign "for the
general advantages of living within the jurisdiction." 2
Whether or not the zeal to abate one's taxes would be considered morally
reprehensible under some abstract system of ethics, it is a fact that short of dishonesty or falsification there is no legal impediment to availing oneself of loopholes, with this end in view. Often, the vagueness and double entendre of statutory language and court decision provide an easy portal through which the
taxpayer can proceed to his goal. There is nothing to prevent a person from
establishing a domicil in a low-taxing state, even if only for the avowed purpose
of paying a minimum of personal taxes, but such person has only himself to
blame if he does not succeed in satisfying the legal requirements of a change of
domicil, or of a retention of the old one, as the case may be.
The instant case presents problems precisely along the lines indicatedproblems which are likely to prove extremely vexatious, unless they are definitively adjudicated in the very near future. Can the estate of a decedent, consisting
of intangible property, such as stocks and bonds, be subjected to an inheritance
tax by more than one state, or would this constitute such obnoxious "double
taxation" as amounts to a taking of property without due process of law, in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution? If
we determine that domicil is the proper legal basis for the taxation of intangible
property, does such determination exclude the right of a state other than that
of the domicil to tax? Is the answer to the last question in any way altered by
the fact that both states claim that the decedent was domiciled within their borders at the time of his death? Since a man can have only one domicil at one
time,' which of the competing states is to be adjudged that of the domicil, and
what tribunal shall be the arbiter of such adjudication? An attempt to answer
these questions necessitates a brief review of the facts of the case, and of the
law applicable to them.
Until 1925, the decedent, Dr. John T. Dorrance, was admittedly domiciled
in New Jersey, making his home upon a modest country estate of seven acres.
In the course of time, he became immensely wealthy as a result of his ownership
of ioo per cent. of the capital stock of the Campbell Soup Company, a corporation situated in Camden, New Jersey, which stock is the subject-matter of the
present controversy, and has been assessed for purposes of taxation at $115,000,ooo. In 1925, Dr. Dorrance and his wife, having concluded that the isolated
'Pa. Sup. C. P., decided Sept. 26, 1932.
'Per Holmes, J., in Fidelity & Col. Trust Co. v. City of Louisville,
Sup. 8 Ct. 40, 44 (1917).
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location of their New Jersey home, adjoining the truck farms of the Campbell
Soup Company, was a hindrance to the education and the social careers of their
children, purchased a sumptuous country estate of almost one hundred and fifty
acres in the suburbs of Philadelphia, at a cost of over $1,oooooo, to which the

family moved. The New Jersey residence was given over to the use of Dr.
Dorrance'5 mother and sister, and thereafter he occasionally, and Mrs. Dorrance
and their children even less frequently, visited or slept there, although by far
the greater part of their time was spent at their Pennsylvania residence. A
comparison of the domestic economies of the two establishments is interesting
and suggestive: whereas ten servants had been employed at the New Jersey
home, only two were retained after the removal of the family; more than twentyfive were regularly employed about the house and grounds of the Pennsylvania
residence. The cost of running the New Jersey home decreased from $29,ooo
in 1924, to $6500 in 1929, in which year expenses at the Pennsylvania residence
aggregated $90,000.
After 1925, Dr. Dorrance and his family entertained exclusively in Penn-

sylvania, and the children attended school and church there, but he himself voted,
paid taxes, and held a vestrymanship in New Jersey. Whenever and wherever
possible, by spoken word and formal document, he asserted that he resided in
New Jersey. He carefully drew his will in such a way as to make it subject
to the probate laws of New Jersey, and thereby to retain intact for his children
his IOO per cent. stock ownership, something he could not accomplish under
the laws of Pennsylvania. By claiming a New Jersey residence, he was able to
effect large savings in taxation. He did not purchase the Pennsylvania property
until he had secured assurance from his legal advisers that he would not thereby
acquire a domicil there unless "he intended to abandon his New Jersey residence." He refused a directorship in the Pennsylvania Railroad until he had
been advised that it was not necessary for him to be a Pennsylvania resident.
Add to this the knowledge that the New Jersey inheritance tax would amount
to $12,000,00o, as compared with $17,ooo,ooo in Pennsylvania, and the picture
is complete in its essential details.
In 193o Dr. Dorrance died, and both New Jersey and Pennsylvania assessed
inheritance taxes against the estate. The latter assessment was upheld by the
Supreme Court of that state, and the executors have appealed from this deision to the Supreme Court of the United States.' Since the Record contains
a plea to the effect that the Pennsylvania tax is a taking of property without
due process of law,5 on the ground that the testator was not a Pennsylvania
domiciliary, and that that state therefore had no jurisdiction to tax, the requisite
Federal question has been raised by the pleadings and denied by the highest court
of a state, thus assuring an adjudication on this perplexing point.
It is obvious that the failure of the Pennsylvania tax commissioners to
accept the New Jersey assessment as conclusive of the question of domicil is not
such an act as denies full faith and credit to the "public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings" 0 of another state. A decree or judgment rendered without jurisdiction is void,7 and not only are the courts of another state not bound
thereby, but are on the contrary morally bound to refuse to give it any effect,
since it is a palpable violation of the requirement of due process of law. The
i6I.
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Pennsylvania tax assessment could have been made upon only one assumption:
that the testator was domiciled within the state. Since the taxation of intangibles
depends upon domicil for its validity, this was an obvious denial that the testator
was domiciled in New Jersey, and therefore a denial of the New Jersey claim
of jurisdiction to tax. Needless to say, by the same reasoning New Jersey is
not concluded from continuing to assert its jurisdiction, thus denying the validity
of the Pennsylvania tax assessment and the judgment founded on it.
The problem, reduced to its simplest terms, is then as follows: two states
claim the domicil of the testator; domicil is determined by the law of the forum ;'
the property in question is taxable for inheritance purposes at the domicil.9 Shall
we therefore conclude that an impregnable case has been made out for taxation
by both states? Inexorable logic would seem to impel us to this conclusion,
were it not that the prohibition against "double taxation" impedes. It therefore
becomes necessary to inquire whether such a course of action constitutes "double
taxation."
The right of a government to tax, and its duty to afford protection or confer a benefit, constitute a perfect correlative."0 Likewise, the duty of the
individual to contribute to the maintenance of the instrumentalities of protection, by paying taxes, is correlative with and dependent upon the right to receive
protection to his life, liberty and property, or some benefit or privilege within
the power of the government to bestow."x It follows from this that where no
benefit is conferred, or no protection afforded, there 1 is
2 no right to tax, and any
attempt to do so is offensive to due process of law.
These postulates have taken certain concrete forms. Thus, land is taxable
at its situsw, and at its situs only, since it is there that it receives all its protection and all the benefits which it is possible for it to receive.' 3 Any attempt to
tax it in any other place, e. g., at the domicil of its owner, would obviously constitute double taxation, and therefore a deprivation of property without due
process of law, and there are countless decisions to this effect. The taxation
of tangible personalty has undergone a long process of development. Starting
with the fiction that movables follow the person, taxation was always permitted
at the domicil of the owner. 14 In addition, of course, the situs was allowed to
tax, on the fundamental theory that it was there that the chattel received its
protection.2
But as tangible personalty increased in both variety and size, and
acquired permanent situs apart from its owner, the fiction of course had to yield
to the reality,"8 and the rule finally became crystallized that a tax upon tangible
§
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personalty at any other place than its actual situs, including the domicil of the
owner, is a taking without due process of law.' 7 Where the chattel is only temporarily away from its owner, so that it has not acquired a situs of its own,
there is no reason for suspending the operation of the fiction, and the place of
its temporary physical presence may not impose a tax on it.18
Concerning the taxation of intangibles, we find no such decisive adjudications, and indeed, until very recently, there was only confusion and chaos. It
is obvious that an ordinary chose in action, such as a simple debt, can have
no situs of its own; it therefore becomes necessary to assign to it an artificial situs for purposes of taxation. There seems to be no good reason
why the fiction mobilia sequuntur personam should not apply, so as to render
the intangible taxable at the domicil of the creditor; the debt, even though
it has no concrete form, is manifestly property in the hands of the creditor,
and if it can be said to have any situs at all, has one that is inseparable
from the creditor's person. 9 Notwithstanding this, for years a forceful but
specious argument was made that the debt was also taxable at the domicil
of the debtor, on the ground that that was the only place which could
make him pay,20 since no other place had jurisdiction over his person. It is
evident that this argument falls to the ground, since any state which secures
control over the debtor's person, no matter for how brief a period, 2 may serve
him with process, render judgment and issue execution against him. Nevertheless, this doctrine, enunciated by Mr. Justice Holmes in the case of Blackstone
v. Miller,22 established the rule that the taxation of intangibles by the states of
both the debtor's and creditor's domicils was not such "double taxation" as
was abhorrent to the law." Manifestly, what has been said about simple debts
applies with equal force to such choses-in-action as have acquired concrete form,
e. g., bonds, certificates of deposit, promissory notes and bills of exchange. The
reduction of the debt into writing does not have the effect of changing it into a
tangible chattel: it still remains an intangible asset, of which the paper is merely
the evidence. A very few states, however, have sought to justify their taxation
of such paper by ascribing to it the properties of tangible personalty,24 a patent
absurdity.
With regard to shares of stock, the proposition was advanced that since
the corporation which issued the shares of stock existed only by virtue of the
laws of the incorporating state, the stock had vitality and validity only as a
result of those laws; since therefore the shareholder looked to those laws for
the protection of his property, the state of incorporation was entitled to a
recompense, whether such shareholder was a resident or not.2 5 The courts
I*Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, upra note 12; Frick v. Pennsylvania,
268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603 (1925).
" Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. I, 23 Sup. Ct. 259 (19o3) ; In re Estate of McCahill, 17I
Cal. 482, 153 Pac. 930 (1915) ; GOODRICH, op. cit. suprca note 7, § 62. On the other hand, its
mere temporary absence from the state of its permanent location does not deprive that
state of the power to tax. In re Estate of Adams, 167 Iowa 382, 149 N. W. 531 (1914).
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 28o U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1930) ; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 5o Sup. Ct. 436 (193o) ; Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U. S. I, 5I Sup. Ct. 54 (1930).
'Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. i89, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903).
Darrah v. Watson, supra note 7.
Supra note 2o.
, See Lowndes, The Passing of Situs-Jurisdctionv to Tax Shares of Corporate Stock
(1932) 45 HARV. L. REV. 777, 780.
" Callahan v. Woodbridge, 171 Mass. 595, 51 N. E. 176 (1898) ; Matter of Morgan, 15o
N. Y. 35, 44 N. E. 1126 (I896).
Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730, 23 Sup. Ct. 401 (I9O3); Hawley v. Maiden, supra
note 9; McDougald v. Low, 164 Cal. IO7, 127 Pac. 1027 (912); People v. Griffith, 245 Ill.
532, 92 N. E. 313 (191o) ; In re Culver's Estate, 145 Iowa 1, 123 N. W. 743 (1909) ; In re
Hallenbecek's Estate, 231 N. Y. 4o9, 132 N. E. 131 (9201)
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recognized the force of this proposition, and permitted taxation by the state of
incorporation as late as the Blodgett case,26 even though multiple taxation resulted, as a consequence of a levy by the state of the shareholder's domicil.
For a long time, it seemed as if the multiple taxation of intangibles was
firmly and permanently intrenched as a valid exercise of the sovereign powers
of two or more states. But suddenly, these subtleties were swept away by a
7
to the
generous dictum in the case of Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v,. Virginia,1
effect that the considerations which operated to make the multiple taxation of
land and tangible personalty a deprivation without due process of law applied
with equal force to the multiple taxation of all intangibles, and that there was
no sound reason for the discrimination between the two categories of property.
The precise holding of the case was simply that intangibles are taxable at the
domicil of the legal title holder, that it was offensive to due process to tax them
at all at the domicil of the holder of the equitable title, and therefore a fortiori
so to tax them in both places. Both the holding and the dictum were revolutionary doctrine, although supported by the soundest common sense, and the
Court in subsequent cases found itself confronted with the problem of whether
it should restrict the scope of both. But the Court evinced no desire to carry
the process of restriction too far, and allowed itself to be swept along by the
current it had itself started. The feeling took form that since inheritance
taxation rests for its justification upon the transmission of property from the
dead to the living, and since this is an event which can by its very nature occur
in only one place at one time, with respect to a particular thing, any attempt
to tax more than once constituted that "double taxation" which violated the
requirements of due process.2 8 Faced with the problem of determining where
the single event of transmitting property from the dead to the living took place,
the court decided that as respects intangibles there was no reason for abrogating
the fiction, just as in the case of land and tangible personalty there was no
reason for applying it, and that the transmission ought therefore to be taxed at
the domicil -of the decedent. 29 This decision was not placed upon any basis of
logic, necessity, or justice, but rather on that of convenience and utility.30
In determining whether inheritance taxation by two states, both claiming
the domicil of the decedent, falls within the proscription, it will be helpful to
review a few of the decisions under the new philosophy. In Farmers Loan
and Trust Co. z. Minnesota,'" it was held that the proper situs for taxation for
bonds and certificates of indebtedness issued by a state was the decedent's
domicil, and that a death transfer tax levied by the state of issuance would be
a taking without due process of law; for the first time, "double taxation" is
labeled as constitutionally objectionable: hitherto, the objections had been solely
upon grounds of social expediency. Blackstone v. Miller was overruled in
verbis. The decision must of course be restricted to cases involving public
securities. The cases of Badwin v. Missouri 2 and Beidler v. South Carolina
Tax Commission 33 reached the same conclusion with respect to other types of
intangibles, such as bank deposits, bonds, promissory notes, and unsecured debts.
The process of demolishing the doctrine of Blackstone v. Miller was finally
completed in First National Bank of Boston v. State of Maine,84 in which the
Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410 (1928).
28o U. S.83, 94, 50 Sup. Ct. 59, 61 (1929).
I See First National Bank of Boston v. State of Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 327, 52 Sup. Ct.
,74, 177 01932).
I Id.at 329, 52 Sup. Ct. at 177-178.
0Id. at 329, 52 Sup. Ct. at 178.
31280 U. S. 204, 5o Sup. Ct. 98 (93o).
"282 U. S. I, 51 Sup. Ct. 54 (930).
=28I U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct 436 (ig3o).
Supra note 28.
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court held (three judges dissenting) that shares of stock, although they differ
from other intangibles in some respects, are not sufficiently different to warrant
their being subjected to an inheritance tax by more than one state, and that
any attempt to do so was a violation of due process. With this decision, the
theory of valid multiple taxation was deprived of its strongest prop, since
whatever logic it had was best exemplified in the case of shares of stock, which
require the laws of both the state of the domicil and that of incorporation to
effectuate a complete transfer.
It would seem to be a fair inference from the above illustrations that the
Supreme Court of the United States stands opposed to any form of multiple
taxation, on Constitutional grounds. There remains, however, one more problem, upon which the Court has consistently refused to express a dictum, and
which, while still undecided, does not permit us to say without hesitation that the
law on the subject is finally and definitely settled. It is well established that
even an intangible may be so used in a place apart from the domicil of its
owner, as to acquire a situs of its own, analogous to the actual situs of tangible
personal property. 5 For example, an Ohio owner of shares of stock may
through an agent in New York deal in them there; a Louisiana owner of bank
deposits situated in New York may through the bank invest and reinvest them
there; a nonresident holder of promissory notes or mortgages may transact
business with those as his stock in trade. In each of the cases mentioned, it is
obvious that for business purposes the intangibles have acquired a situs of their
own, that they are in active business competition with local capital, and that
they should not only be subject to regulation by the state of their situs, but
should be made to pay a tax for the privilege of doing business there. The
question remains, however, whether the Court would also countenance taxation by the state of the owner's domicil. It would seem that the Court has
too far committed itself to the doctrine that multiple taxation is obnoxious, to
retract at this late date, and that since intangibles so employed are much more
analogous to tangible personalty than to ordinary intangibles, taxation at the
situs will be held exclusive, in a proper case, and taxation at the domicil prohibited. It is of course too plain for words that to withdraw from the state of
the situs its right to tax would be both an interference with its sovereign power
to regulate business within its territorial limits, and discrimination and an injustice to local capital, 38 since foreign
capital, not having any taxes to pay, would
37
be at a competitive advantage.
Can the testator's ownership of ioo per cent. of the capital stock of the
Campbell Soup Company, all of whose business activities took place in New
Jersey, be said to have given the shares of stock a "business situs" in that state?
Obviously, if the notion of corporate entity is to have any significance, it is not
the testator's property that is present in New Jersey, but the corporation's. The
testator's property, as represented by the shares of stock, was merely an intangible right to dividends as they might be declared, and to a share in the
assets of the corporation upon dissolution, after debts had been paid, and
therefore followed the person of the testator, being taxable at his domicil,
wherever that might be. The doctrine of "business situs" has reference to
something quite different from the situation just delineated: it imports a dealing
'New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. IiO (1899) ; Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133, 20 Sup. Ct. 585 (igoo) ; State Board of Assessors v. Comptoir
National d' Escompte, 19i U. S. 388, 24 Sup. Ct. lO9 (1903) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
New Orleans, 2o5 U. S. 395, 27 Sup. Ct. 499 (19o7) ; Liverpool etc. Ins. Co. v. Board of
Assessors, 221 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 55o (1911) ; Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt. 152 (1849); Powell,
The Business Situs of Credits (1922) 28 W. VA. L. Q. 89.
"82 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note i0, § 465n.
Powell, supra note 35, passim.
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with the intangibles for purposes of investment and reinvestment, with such
intangibles representing the sole stock in trade of the person so dealing. It is
only then that they enter into competition with local business, so as to give them
that sits for business purposes which justifies their being taxed."8 The situs
of tihe corporationin the State of New Jersey, while it may give rise to a right
in that state to tax the corporate activities or its property, can not without more
give the right to tax the shares of stock on the theory that they had acquired a
"business situs" within the state, since it is very evident that they had never
been localized there as the stock in trade of any business.3 9
Can we safely turn now from diagnosis to prognosis, and predict that the
Court will find that an attempt by two states to levy inheritance taxes on intangibles, both claiming that the decedent was domiciled there, is "double taxation"? Such a conclusion would seem to be inevitable, when it is considered
that the whole purpose of the recent decisions has been to avoid compelling an
owner to pay twice, whether on serious or frivolous pretexts. Besides, since
the event of transmission is single in its nature, it would at first blush appear
to be a violation of every rule of common sense to allow the estate to be taxed
more than once. The inquiry is therefore very pertinent whether there is such
imminent danger of the supposititious evil as to warrant a change in the rule
that domicil is determinable by the law of the forum, and the denomination of
an impartial tribunal, applying law of its own, as a substitute.
Domicil is a conclusion of law, flowing from certain facts. It would serve
no useful purpose to collate and compare here the multitude of definitions of
the term, since that has already been done in more than one scholarly and
searching work.40 It will be sufficient for our needs to notice that they all
define domicil in terms of one controlling element-home or residence. Home
is the operative fact from which emanates the legal consequence of 'domicil.
When one has therefore fulfilled the requirements of acquiring a domicil of
choice, i. e., actual residence and the intention of making such actual residence
follows without more,4 2 whether one intended
one's home, 41 the legal consequence
43
not.
or
conclusion
the legal

What has been said concerning the acquisition of an original domicil of
choice necessarily applies to any change of domicils of choice. Such change
can be effectuated only by an actual physical shift, i. e., an abandonment 6f
the old residence and the adoption of a new one, accompanied by the intention
to make the new residence one's home, in the fullest sense of that word. Where
is the domicil of the person who acquires a new residence, but at the same time
retains his old one? Since it is fundamental that a person can have only one
domicil at one time, such person must choose his principal home between the two. If he fails to do so, the law will do it for him, having
regard to his intention, as indicated not by self-serving declarations or equivocal
acts, but to such acts and declarations as clearly indicate that he looked upon
one or the other of his two residences as home. 44 It is no concern of the law
' See Catlin v. Hull, supra note 35, at 16I. Accord: Goldgart v. People ex rel. Goar,
IIi 25, 28 (1883).
See Powell, supra note 35, at io8.
,GOODRI cH, op. cit. supra note 7; JAcoas, THE LAW OF DOmICimE (1887); STORY, CONFmLCT OF LAws (8th ed. 1883); Coudert, The, Law of Domicil (1927) 5o N. Y. Bar Ass'n
Rep. 148, 166; DicEY, CoNFLICr OF LAWs (4th ed. 1927).
a Dupuy v. Wurtz, supra note 3; Kerby v. Charlestown, 78 N. H. 301, 99 Ad. 835
(1916) ; Douglas v. Douglas, L. R. 12 Eq. 617 (1871) ; Coudert, op. cit. supra note 4o.
0DicEY, op. cit. supra note 40, at io6.
,"The intention required for the acquisition of a domicil of choice is an intention to
make a home in fact, and not an intention to acquire a domicil:' CoznIcr OF LAws RESTATEMENT, Proposed Final Draft No. i (Am. L. Inst. 1930) § 21.
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what his motive was in retaining his old home or in acquiring a new one:

45

it

is sufficient that he has satisfied the legal requirements of retention or of change,
as the case may be. Of course, the motive with which a man acquires a new
residence is often determinative of the question of his intention to remain,
either negatively or positively, and thus indirectly of his intention to make or
not to make his home in the new locality. Thus, where a person's only motive
in changing his residence is to satisfy the residence requirements incidental to
obtaining a divorce, it is easier to conclude from this that his intention was not
to make his home in the new locality, than if the change was made from more
general motives, e. g., to enjoy the general social advantages offered by the new
locality.
Applying these principles to the instant case, can it be said that the decedent's domicil remained in New Jersey, after the acquisition of the Pennsylvania
dwelling-place? "A man's home is where he makes it, not where he would like
to have it" ;4 that is fundamental. The salient features of a man's home are its
physical characteristics; the time he spends therein; the things he does therein;
the persons and things therein; his mental attitude toward the place; his intention when absent to return to the place; the elements of his other dwellingplaces, if any.4 7 None of these factors is per se conclusive, but they must be
nicely balanced, and the domicil fixated by the preponderating group. In favor
of the claim of domicil in New Jersey, we have only the dubious factors of the
testator's self-serving declarations and of his very occasional visits there. 4 No
importance can be attached to such transparent subterfuges as the agreement
between the decedent and his wife that they should vote only from New Jersey,49
or to his having secured an appointment to a commission to study the problem
of compulsory motor insurance in that state." Such acts and declarations are
completely overshadowed by the fact that his acts with relation to his Pennsylvania residence were those of a man to his home. One does not ordinarily
spend over one million dollars on an auxiliary residence, or pass almost all of
one's time or do one's entire entertaining in such auxiliary residence, and at
the same time retain a very much less elaborate place as one's principal home.
This conclusion is powerfully reinforced by the fact that the testator's very
apparent motive in asserting a retention of his New Jersey domicil, as gathered
from his acts, was to abate taxes: this circumstance tends to the inevitable conclusion that he had come to look upon the Pennsylvania dwelling-place as his
home, and felt it necessary to justify his claim that the New Jersey residence
was his home by frequent and conspicuous assertions to that effect.
But even conceding that the Pennsylvania judgment was a very fair adjudication of domicil, there is nothing to prevent the New Jersey court from deciding that the testator was domiciled there. 51 Such a determination, depending
as it does upon factors as variable as those involved in the intention to make a
home, is by no means beyond the realm of possibility: 52 it is easily accomplished
by stressing certain of them and giving only nominal weight to others.
"See Draper v. Hatfield, 124 Mass. 53, 56 (1878) ; CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATemENT
(Am. L. Inst. I93O) § 24.
Kerby v. Charlestown, supra note 41, at 3o7, 99 Atl. at 838.
,Op. cit. supra note 45, § 15.
See In re Paris' Estate, 107 Misc. 463, 469, 176 N. Y. Supp. 879, 882 (i919).
"See Record, vol. III, p. 963a.
60Id., p. 984a.
'See Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U. S. 43, 53, 28 Sup. Ct. i, 4 (1o7). Accord: Frederick v.
Wilbourne, i98 Ala. 137, 73 So. 442 (I916).
Thus, there seems to be a tendency in the New Jersey adjudications to stress the
declarationsof the purported domiciliary, at the expense of his acts. Givernaud v. Variel, 86
N. J. Eq. 8o, 97 Atl. 49 (1916) ; In re Paullin, 92 N. J. Eq. 419, 113 Atl. 24o (12i); Rinaldi
v. Rinaldi, 94 N. J. Eq. 14, 118 At. 685 (1922).
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The Supreme Court of the United States has had two previous opportunities to decide whether it would assume the r6le of final arbiter of conflicting
claims of domicil, but with vast relief has succeeded in finding reasons in both
cases for refusing to establish a new rule. In the case of Tilt v. Kelsey,5' it
was held that since the court of the second state had rendered a judgment involving an adjudication of domicil without attacking the jurisdiction of the court
of the first state, the latter court must be held to have had jurisdiction, and the
failure to recognize its judgment was a denial of full faith and credit, thus invalidating the finding of domicil by the second court. But must such an 'attack
be made in verbis? Was not the very fact of taking the case by the second court
an implied denial that the first court had jurisdiction? In Baker v. Baker,
Eccles & Co., 4 the Court held that since the judgment appealed from, which
contained a finding of domicil, had been rendered in an in personam action,
although the court had had no personal jurisdiction over the defendant, it was
invalid, and the adjudication of domicil by the court of the other state must
control. It is obvious that the Supreme Court is not anxious to decide this question, since if it once sets itself up as the arbiter, it would be opening the door to
a flood of relatively unimportant litigation of all sorts. Yet it is difficult to see
how it could refuse to take jurisdiction in a proper case. Since domicil is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the power to impose a tax, and since the guaranty of
due process of law is therefore invoked whenever it is alleged that a tax is being
levied without jurisdiction, it follows that the requisite constitutional question is
raised, and it would seem that the Court must take jurisdiction. The Court is
thus faced with the following unpleasant alternative: it can either adhere to its
traditional notion that its jurisdiction is not that of a general reviewing court,
but is limited to specific instances of denials of federal rights, and therefore does
not extend to reviewing a factual finding of domicil,55 or it can assume jurisdiction of a case like the present for all purposes, including that of adjudicating the
facts upon which some principle of conflict of laws is based.5" - Such a decision
could of course in no way conclude New Jersey from proceeding to collect its
tax, by asserting that the testator was domiciled there,, since that state was not
a party to the present proceedings, and the judgment could therefore have no7
effect upon its course of action, the incidents of res adjudicata being absent.
Also, such an act could in no sense be considered a denial of full faith and credit
to the Pennsylvania judgment, since, as has been pointed out, no court is bound
to respect a judgment which was rendered without jurisdiction, and the tax
assessment would be a tacit refutation of such jurisdiction. Nor could New
Jersey by intervening become a party to the present appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States, since it is a rule of federal procedure that there can be no
intervention in an appellate court, 58 and it has been so held in the principal case."
' Supra note 51.
U242 U. S. 394, 37 Sup. Ct. 152 (1917).
Kinzell v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 33 Idaho i, I9o Pac. :255 (1920).
See Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of
Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 HARv. L. REv. 533.
'Colvin v. Jones, 194 Mich. 67o, 161 N. W. 847 (1917) ; Matter of Horton, 217 N. Y.
363, III N. E. io66 (1916); Matter of Paris, supra note 48.

"The only parties the court can know are those in the record." Per Marshall, C. J.,
in Harrison v. Nixon, 9 Pet. 483, 494 (U. S. 1835). Accord: Veitia v. Fortuna Estates, 240
Fed. 256 (C. C. A. ist, 1917); Wenborne-Karpen Dryer Co. v. Cutler Dry Kiln Co., 292
Fed. 86i (C. C. A. 2d, 1923).

Intervention is a means of becoming party to a suit pending between two other parties,
and therefore by its very nature requires timely action. Since a suit is no longer pending
after the issues have been judicially determined and a judgment rendered thereon, a would-be
intervener can no longer intervene. Zeitinger v. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 298
Mo. 461, 25o S. W. 913 (1923) ; Youngberg v. Youngberg, 44 S. D. I, 181 N. W. 835 (1921).
For an exhaustive article covering the whole topic of intervention, see Hersman, Intervention
in FederalCourts (1927) 61 Ams. L. Rav. I, 161.
0 U. S. Daily, Nov. 15, 1932, at i66.
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It would seem that if the Court aims to achieve consistency in its opposition
to multiple taxation, it would be irresistibly impelled to adopt the second of the
courses mentioned above, upon the reasoning that since domicil is a jurisdictional
fact, a question of due process is squarely presented by every such dispute, and
Federal adjudication is therefore necessary. But although consistency is an indispensable element of logic, it by no means follows that it is a sine qua non
of the law, especially when the forces which would ordinarily induce relentless
consistency are absent. Concretely, the recent tendency of the Supreme Court
to damn multiple taxation proceeded upon the inarticulate major premise that
there was a more or less systematic attempt on the part of the taxing officials
of more than one state to gouge the estates of decedents, as a facile method of
obtaining revenue, and that this has been provocative of discord between the
states.?' On one pretext or another, such officials, who are usually not learned
in the law, have attempted to assert the jurisdiction of the state over the intangible assets of the decedent, with a view to levying the inevitable inheritance tax.
The practice finally reached such dangerous proportions that the Court felt
itself constrained to check its vicious progress. A radically different situation
is presented by the instant case: the taxation of ordinary intangibles is proper
only if the decedent was domiciled within the state at the time of his death;
the findings of the tax commissioners of a given state are not final, but the personal representatives of the deceased may resist the imposition of such a tax in
the courts of the state, on the ground that his domicil was elsewhere, and may
by proper procedure carry their contention to the highest court of the state,
where it will be soberly adjudicated by men who occupy the position of arbiters
of legal disputes by virtue of the confidence imposed in them by the electorate
or the appointive power, and who are not swayed by an uncontrolled desire to
fill the coffers of the state by any available means. There is no assurance that
in the instant case the testator would be found to have been domiciled in New
Jersey by the Supreme Court of that state, if the question were laid before that
tribunal in a proper case. The fact that the executors are not inclined to seek
an adjudication on this point rather supports the theory that they do not welcome a possible finding by the New Jersey Supreme Court that he was domiciled in Pennsylvania.
Even if the Supreme Court of New Jersey should decide that the testator
was domiciled there, this would still be no sufficient justification for changing
the rule, merely in order to achieve the dubious virtue of consistency. As has
been pointed out, the species of "double taxation" which the Court has held
to offend due process has been a systematic one. The mere fact that this is a
case of first impression is eloquent evidence that this type of situation does not,
and cannot arise very frequently, since the sober check of the highest court of
the state is interposed upon any attempt by tax officials illegally to subject decedents' estates to taxation. The law of domicil is sufficiently uniform throughout the United States to militate against any wholesale multiple finding of
domicil. But even assuming that the laws of two states differ sufficiently so
that such an event might occasionally occur, is it proper that so isolated a situation should impel the Supreme Court of the United States to abrogate a
well-established rule, which is usually productive of perfect justice, and thereby
deprive the states of an attribute of sovereignty? It is every man's privilege to
establish his domicil where he would, but if he does not succeed in clarifying
his legal status, it is certainly not the function of that august body, the Supreme
Court of the United States, to complete the process of clarification for him.
The Court has not irrevocably committed itself to the proposition that all multiple taxation of intangibles, of every possible description, is that "double taxa® See Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra note

19, at 209.
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tion" which falls under the ban as a denial of due process: that this statement
is true is amply proved by the fact that it has left open the question of whether
intangibles which have acquired a "business situs" may also be taxed at the
domicil of their owner."' The court will not have to beat an undignified retreat, it has judiciously left open the precise definition of "double taxation",
with the realization that the time is not yet ripe for any conclusive definition
of that term: it is under no compulsion to find that any specific type of multiple
taxation, aside from the types which it has already so characterized, falls under
the ban. It can with perfect propriety find that where the highest tribunals of
two states have solemnly reached the conclusion that a decedent was domiciled
there, both states may tax, since there is very little likelihood that any systematic
gouging of decedent's estates would follow. By doing so, it would be leaving
undisturbed the well-established rule that questions of domicil are determinable
by the law of the forum, any deviation from which would lead to the most
unpleasant complications, and would save itself from being deluged by a torrent
of inconsequential business. Even if the state court erroneously applies conflict of laws principles, it is after all merely applying its local common law, and
so long as there was personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the Supreme
Court is not compelled 2to find in every such misapplication a denial of some
constitutional guaranty.6
Meanwhile New Jersey has adopted drastic measures. It has seen in the
conflicting claims of domicil made by it anal Pennsylvania such a "controversy"
between the two states as justifies invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as granted by Article III, Sections i and 2 of the United States
Constitution, in an action to enjoin the State of Pennsylvania from attempting
to collect the tax assessed by it."' The utility of such a course is questionable:
it is very dubious whether the problem presents "a controversy between two
states." 64 While the term "controversy" in this connection has, like other
Constitutional terms, been exempted from precise definition, a review of some
of the cases involving disputes between two states leads to the inevitable conclusion that the Court demands that there be a very tangible and substantial grievance before it is willing to wield the drastic weapon of injunction against a
sovereign state. 8' There is nothing in the petition which shows that New Jersey
has suffered, or is likely to suffer, any harm. Her right to collect her tax
assessment is in no way impaired by similar action on the part of Pennsylvania. There is lacking that threat of irreparable injury which equity demands
before it will issue an injunction. That she may not maintain such an action
S"We do not overlook the possibility that shares of stock, as well as other intangibles,
may be so used in a state other than that of the owner's domicile as to give them a situs analogous to the actual situs of tangible personal property. . . . That question heretofore has
been reserved, and it still is reserved to be disposed of when, if ever, it properly shall be presented for our consideration." First Nat. Bank of Boston v. State of Maine, supra note 28,
at 331, 52 Sup. Ct. at 178.
See Gasquet v. Lapeyre, 242 U. S. 367, 369, 37 Sup. Ct. 165, 166 (917) ; Kryger v.
Wilson, 242 U. S.171, 37 Sup. Ct. 34 (1g16).
'U. S. Daily, November 7, 1932, at 1611, 1614. The Supreme Court has issued a rule
requiring Pennsylvania to show cause why leave to file this bill should not be granted to New
Jersey. U. S. Daily, November 15, 1932, at 1662.
",The jurisdiction over controversies between states which is conferred upon the Supreme
Court by the Constitution was intended as a substitute for the diplomatic settlement of controversies between sovereigns and a possible resort to force. Therefore this jurisdiction is
limited to disputes which between independent states would be a proper matter for diplomatic
adjustment. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365, 44 Sup. Ct. 138 (1923) ; Note (1923)
io VA.L. REv.
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147.

New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S.296, 41 Sup. Ct.
U. S. 496, 26 Sup. Ct. 268 (igo6).

492 (92);

Missouri v. Illinois,
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on behalf of the testator, on the ground that he was a citizen of New Jersey,
is well settled."8
If her attempt to collect the tax should be resisted in her own courts by
the executors of the estate, she will nevertheless have to abide by their adjudication as to whether the testator was or was not domiciled in New Jersey. If
the finding is that he was not, New Jersey would have no power to prevent
Pennsylvania from collecting her tax; if it is found that he was, New Jersey
could proceed to collect it, but would have no interest in her sovereign capacity
to protest against a similar collection by Pennsylvania. From no point of view,
then, has New Jersey such an interest in the course of action adopted by Pennsylvania as to warrant an exercise of the seldom-used (and most reluctantly
used on the rare occasions when it is) jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
adjudicate between sovereign states. Such jurisdiction has hitherto been exercised only when the sovereign rights of a given state have been infringed by
the action of another state ;67 and then only when the intrusion has been of a
serious magnitude. Familiar examples of justiciable controversies between
states have been disputes as to boundaries; 8 the diversion of streams; 69 the
doing of acts within one state which cuts off the water supply in another; 71
the discharge of sewage into a body of water, with an alleged deleterious
effect upon the health of citizens of another state. 1 It is obvious that
the the present situation, which involves nothing more than a difference
of opinion concerning a principle of conflict of laws, is in no way such an
offense against the sovereignty of the State of New Jersey as merits Supreme
Court interference. In fact, the Court has refused to take jurisdiction upon a
very similar set of facts. In the case of Iowa v. Slimmer et al.,7 2 (the State of
Minnesota being a party defendant) the State of Iowa, claiming that the decedent had been domiciled there, asked leave to file a petition that it be decreed
and adjudged that pending this suit, an injunction issue, restraining the prosecution of the Minnesota probate proceedings. The Court, in denying leave to
file the petition, held that the Minnesota court had jurisdiction in a proper action
to determine the domicil of the decedent, and that the Minnesota probate proceedings would therefore not be enjoined. This decision sufficiently illustrates
that the mere maladministration of the laws of one state, which results in injury
to the citizens of another,
does not raise a justiciable controversy between the
73
two states as states.

The rule has developed, apparently as the result of experience, that a question of domicil is most satisfactorily determined by the law of the forum, since
the public policy of a given forum may prescribe different factual requisites than
that of another. There is no pressing reason for changing the rule, in the absence
of a showing that it is likely to result in great hardship. It has been pointed out
that since the final courts of the various states act as checks upon the too great
exuberance of fiscal functionaries, there is very little danger that an individual
may be found to be a domiciliary by the supreme courts of more than one
state, and thus subjected to multiple levies in those types of taxation which
depend for their validity upon domicil: courts sworn to interpret the law accord'Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. I, 20 Sup. Ct. 251 (19oo) ; North Dakota v. Minnesota,
supra note 64; Note (1923) 10 VA. L. REv. 147.
,' North Dakota v. Minnesota, supra note 64.
, Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 14 Pet. 210 (U. S. 184o); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148
U. S. 503, 13 Sup. Ct. 728 (1893) ; Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359, 12 Sup. Ct. 396 (1892).
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419, 42 Sup. Ct. 552 (1922).
'Kansas
v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 655 (i9o,7).
'
Missouri v. Illinois; New York v. New Jersey, both supra note 65.
'248
U. S. 115, 39 Sup. Ct. 33 (ii8).
See Louisiana v. Texas, supra note 66, at 22; 2o Sup. Ct. at 258; Kryger v. Wilson,
supra note 62.
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ing to what they believe it to be are not very likely to place the financial welfare
of their states above their notions of fundamental justice, but in the vast majority of cases will render honest opinions upon a subject which by its very
nature depends upon variable factors. If two courts should occasionally both
conclude that a party was domiciled within their territorial jurisdiction, such
conclusions cannot possibly assume the widespread dimensions of that 8ystematic mulcting of decedents' estates which has evoked the prohibitory stricture
of the United States Supreme Court against "double taxation". It is submitted
that the situation in question is not within the intendment of that accordion
term, since it does not have within it the potentialities for social evil which
prompted the invocation of the due process clause in prohibition of other types
of multiple taxation. Conflicting claims of domicil can very seldom arise: they
are present most usually when an individual seeks to enjoy the protection and
the social advantages of one jurisdiction and at the same time avail himself
of the low tax rate of another. If he has made an imperfect job of his ostensible change or retention of domicil, there is no reason why the law should aid
him in perfecting an ungracious process. Since no useful purpose can be served
by changing the rule that domicil is determinable by the law of the forum, but
since, on the contrary, such a change can only result in overcrowding the Supreme Court docket, and in depriving the states of the right to determine a
purely local matter by their own law, there is every reason for retaining the
rule in its present form.
A. R.-C.
LEGAL CAUSE AND

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY-How

proximate to the

death of the victim must an act be so as to render the actor criminally "responsible? This problem can be illustrated by the recent Indiana case of Stephenson
v. State.' where the defendant committed rape upon the deceased.2 Some hours
later, while still in the custody of the defendant, but without his knowledge, the
deceased, "distracted with the pain and shame so inflicted upon her" 3 procured
and swallowed poison. The court 4 based its aflirmance of the conviction of
homicide 5 on the ground that the act of the deceased in administering the poison
to herself was legally the act of the defendant, and found that "the evidence was
sufficient and justified the jury in finding that the appellant by his acts and conduct rendered the deceased distracted and mentally irresponsible, and that such
was the natural and probable consequences of such unlawful conduct." There
was, however, no specific finding by the jury that the deceased's mind was not
clear and sound. On the contrary, it appears that the taking of the poison by
the deceased was a conscious, deliberate act done because of "shame, humiliation

or remorse." 6

Cited in support of the decision is the case of Wilder v. Russell Library
Co., 7 where the claimant, as a dependent of the deceased was awarded compen2 179

N. E. 633 (Ind. 1932), (1932) 45 HAuv. L. REV. 1261.

'The fact that

the death was caused in part by an infection probably caused by one of
the wounds inflicted by defendant is omitted since it is neither essential nor helpful to the
analysis of the case as here presented.
'The words quoted are those used in count one of the indictment, on which the defendant
was convicted.
'Two judges dissenting.
'The conviction was of murder in the second degree. Malice was present because defendant was engaged in the commission of a felony (rape).
'This is pointed out by Martin, J., dissenting.
7io7 Conn. 56, 139 Atl. 644 (1927).
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sation. The deceased's occupation had caused a breakdown in her health which
led to her insanity and finally to her "suicide." 8 There, however, the facts
found were that the decedent's act of self-destruction was due to uncontrollable
impulse. Equally applicable to criminal cases, such as Stephenson v. State, and
to workmen's compensation cases is the principle that where, as the direct result
of a physical injury, an insanity results of such violence as to cause the victim
to take his own life through an uncontrollable impulse, or in a delirium, or
without conscious volition to produce death, or without having knowledge of
the physical consequences of the act, then there is a direct and unbroken causal
connection between the physical injury and the death. But where the act of
suicide follows a voluntary, wilful choice, and the victim knows the purpose
and the physical effect of the suicidal act, then there is a new and independent
force which breaks the chain of causation arising from the injury.9 The Torts
Restatement, following the leading tort cases, adopts substantially the same rule
in cases where the defendant's negligence was the cause of the injury which led
to the suicide.' 0 The practical difficulty of determining the victim's state of
mind at the time of the suicidal act is a factor which tends to limit responsibility
for the death to cases of actual insanity.
The citation of a civil case by a court in a criminal case, raises the question
whether the rules governing causal connection (i. e., that degree of causation
necessary to hold the defendant responsible) are the same in both civil and criminal cases. Cases arising under Workmen's Compensation Acts requiring only
proof that the injury or death was caused in the course of the employment
seem to be more closely comparable to criminal cases than negligence cases because the issue of causation is so clearly outlined. No negligence or fault need
be shown, and foreseeability is not a factor to be considered. In the ordinary
case, whether it be a negligence case, or a criminal case, or one of compensation,
causal connection is a purely physical thing, and it seems that the same rules
of causation should apply to all these cases, provided that the issue of cause
is distinguished from the other issues in the case. Probably, this concept of
causation as an isolated issue which is insulated from the effect of other considerations is most closely approached in the compensation cases. Even though the
attempt should be made to treat causal connection as a purely physical thing,
it nevertheless seems both necessary and proper to permit the issue of cause to
be affected by other considerations in cases where it is difficult to decide whether
causal connection exists or is lacking.
case is very unusual since it considers suicide, without a preceding traumatic injury
cThe
or compensable disease, as an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment, and
hence subject to compensation.
9
Wilder v. Russell Library Co., supra note 7; In re Sponatski, 22o Mass. 526, io8 N. E.
466 (1915) ; McKane v. Capital Hill Quarry Co., IOO Vt. 45, 134 At. 640 (1926). The English compensation cases, however, do not require that the one committing the act of selfdestruction shall not have been conscious of the physical consequence of his act if that act
was the result of a disordered mind which was proximately caused by the original injury.
See cases cited in Note (1928) 56 A. L. R. 461; (I921) 69 U. OF PA. L. REv. 286; (I903)
17 HARv. L. Rav. 125.
The rule stated has already been applied in criminal cases. In State v. Angelina, 73 W.
Va. 146, 8o S. E. 141 (913), it was held that when suicide follows a wound inflicted by the
defendant, his act is the cause of death if deceased was rendered irresponsible by the wound
and as the natural result of it. In Stanton's Case, 2 Rogers City Hall Recorder 164 (N. Y.
1817), a blow was struck which broke a person's skull, and a surgeon performed the operation
of trepanning, after which there was a great likelihood of recovery, but in fits of delirium
the deceased tore open his wound, and death resulted. The delirium was found to be the
result of the blow on the head, and the death was deemed to have been occasioned by the
blow. See also Lewis v. Commonwealth, xg Ky. L. Rep. 1139, 42 S. W. 1i27 (897).
ToRTs, RESTATFmENT, Tentative Draft No. 8 (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 330. The rule
adopted in tort cases is well stated in Daniels v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 183 Mass. 393,
67 N. E. 424 (io3). Contra: Garrigan v. Kennedy, 19 S. D. ii, ioI N . W. io8i (i9o4).
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We may, first of all, eliminate one factor which is usually said to make
criminal cases different from civil cases. This factor is the degree of proof
required. In civil cases, the plaintiff succeeds if he offers a preponderance of
the evidence. In criminal cases, the state must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It seems clear that this variation in the degree of
proof does not affect the problem of causation or the legal principles to be applied.
Of course, more evidence is necessary to convict of a crime than is required in
order to find a money judgment against the defendant, but the legal principles
involved are not thereby affected. It is probably true that in cases where the
question of causal connection is doubtful, the jury in a civil case is more likely
to find against the defendant than is a jury in a criminal case, but this has no
bearing on the principles of causation to be applied.
It has often been observed that "from the point of view of social interest,
it would seem that the law should attach responsibility for more remote and
unlikely consequences when defendant's act is criminal, or consciously wrongful,
than when it is merely negligent, since it is specially advantageous to society to
discourage such acts . . . there is abundant evidence of such a tendency in the
law." 11 Such statements as this, however, do not mean that an act Will be considered to extend to more remote consequences in criminal actions than in civil
actions. The statement means that in finding liability in civil cases unlawful
acts will result in liability for more remote consequences than will merely negligent acts. The reason for this tendency probably is that it seems more just
to hold the defendant liable for remote consequences where his act was consciously wrongful than where it was merely negligent.
It should be noted that the criminal law has for its primary purpose the protection of the public,1" while the purpose of the civil law is to protect the rights
of the individual. Thus it is that in civil cases the plaintiff's conduct may defeat
the protection that the law gives to his interests against the defendant's acts.
For example, even though the defendant has been negligent, if the plaintiff has
also been negligent, or has voluntarily assumed the risk created by the defendant's negligence, the law will not protect the plaintiff. The reason is not lack
of causation but rather that the defendant's culpable conduct is offset by the
plaintiff's culpable conduct, and the plaintiff has thus defeated the protection
that the law would otherwise have afforded him. In the criminal law, however,
the victim's unlawful act will not relieve the defendant from guilt, because the
offense is against the state and not against the individual.13
Even though it be conceded that causation in crimes is the same as in civil
cases, and even though the same definition of cause is used in both fields, it
does not necessarily follow that we cannot justifiably and properly attach different legal consequences to the same set of facts, depending on whether the case
is civil or criminal. Let us consider the definition given in the Torts Restatement: "The actor's negligent conduct is a cause of another's injury if his con'Edgerton, Legal Cause (1924) 72 U. OF P. L. Rav. 211, 343, at 366. The tendency is
noted by Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort (1911) 25 HARv. L. REv. 103, 223, at 230.
It is pointed out in i STRF r, Tim FOUNDATIONS OF LFGALs LiBMITY (19o6) iii, that "Not

only is the line of demarcation between proximate and remote damage undefined and undefinable-it is really a flexible line; for we find this to be true, that as the wrongful act which
is alleged to have caused the damage increases in moral obliquity or in illegality, the legal
eye reaches further and will declare damage to be proximate which in other connections
would be considered to be remote."
1 CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1912) § 2. To quote Pound, in an introduction to SAYR_, CASES ON CRrMNAL LAW (1927) p. xxxii, "Criminal Law has for its

province the securing of social interests regarded directly as such, that is, dissociated from
any immediate individual interests with which they may be identified."
I CLARK & MAISHAL., op. cit. supra note 12, § 158.
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duct is a substantial factor in bringing it about." 14 The comment to this definition points out that the word "substantial" is used "to denote the fact that the
defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the injury as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that term in the popular sense in which
there always lurks the idea of responsibility, . .

."

In criminal, as well as in

civil cases, where the question of cause is a difficult one, the deciding factor may
be the consideration, either consciously or unconsciously, of whether it is just,
in view of the competing social and individual interests, to convict the defendant. Since these competing interests are not quite the same in civil and
criminal cases, it seems to follow that in the border-line cases, we may properly
make different findings on the same set of facts.
The reason for the general assumption that causal connection is one thing
in torts and another in crimes probably is the fact that causation is more difficult
to isolate in the ordinary tort case, since any problem of negligence involves the
factor of foreseeability."i But since causation is a neutral problem, there is no
reason why the principles of causation enunciated by courts in civil cases may
not properly be cited by courts in criminal cases provided the civil courts have
differentiated the problem of causation from the issue of negligence. 16
In the Stephenson case, it was pointed out that the victim's mental state
at the time of the act immediately causing death might break the chain of causation between the defendant's act causing physical injury to the victim and the
death. It is interesting to consider whether the same result follows in a case
where the victim's consciousness that his own act will cause death occurs before
the defendant's act has caused physical injury to the victim.
Suppose that A with malice puts poison into a glass of water and puts the
liquid where B will be likely to find it and drink it. The liquid appears to be
water. Case I: B drinks the liquid thinking it is water. Case 2: B knows what
A has done, but B has been contemplating suicide for a long time, and recognizing that this is an excellent opportunity to end his life immediately, drinks
the poisoned water. A is indicted for murder. Murder consists of a certain
mental element (malice) and an act causing death. It is conceded that A had
malice and the only question is whether A's act of putting the poison into the
water caused B's death.
Of course, both A's act and B's act were to some extent actual causes of
the death. Each act was a sine qua non. Resolving the question into one of
legal cause (i. e., that degree of cause required in order to convict of homicide)
there are three possible solutions: first, that A alone caused the death; secondly,
that both A and B caused the death; and thirdly, that B alone caused the death.
The first two may be considered together, since A may be convicted under either
view. However, it is unlikely that a court would find that both persons caused
the death since they were not acting in concert. It is possible, of course, to
have a situation where both the defendant's and the victim's act contributed to
cause the death, as in the case where one mortally wounds another
who cuts his
7
own throat and dies from loss of blood from both wounds.1
In regard to our hypothetical case where B thinks he is drinking water,
the courts universally and correctly find that A alone has caused B's deatha&
" TORTs, RESTATEMENT, Tentative Draft No. 8 (Am.L. Inst. 1932) § 306. Edgerton,
suptfa note II, at 348: ". . . a legal cause is a cause which stands in such. a relation to its
consequence that it is just to give legal effect to the relation: meaning by 'just', not merely
fair as between the parties, but socially advantageous, as serving the most important of the
competing individual and social interests involved."
'GREEN,

RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (I927)

171.

Reasonable anticipation (foreseeability) is a characteristic of negligence, not of physical
causation. City of Milwaukee v. Industrial Commission, 16o Wis. 238, 151 N. W. 247 (I9,5).
People v. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, 57 Pac. 470 (1899); Note (I89w) 13 HARV. L. REv. 219.
"CLARK & MARSHAL, op. cit. supra note I2, § 168. See Gore's Case, 9 Coke 8I (K. B.
1611) ; Brunson v. State, I24 Ala. 37, 27 So. 410 (9oo).
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B, in drinking the liquid, is considered as A's instrument for administering the
poison, and is usually called an innocent or irresponsible agent. The introduction, in the second case, of the fact that B knows that the liquid is poisonous
immediately changes our emotional reaction. 19 It may safely be predicted that
most courts would distinguish the two situations. Yet the acts are exactly the
same. In both cases, A poisoned the water and B drank the liquid. If we find in
the first case that B did not cause his own death by drinking the liquid, how can
we find that he did in the second case? How can a change in B's mental state
bring about a change in causal relationship? A distinction should be made between the two situations which can be rationalized in terms of social interests
and phrased in terms of cause.
The most sensible approach to the problem is to recognize at the beginning
that both A's act and B's act are causes in fact, and each sufficiently close to
the result to be taken cognizance of by the law. In tort cases, it is recognized
that defendant's negligence may be the proximate cause of an injury of which
the immediate cause is the intentional act of another who is also responsible for
20
the loss.

To illustrate: X, a salesman in a busy jewelry store, carelessly leaves

a diamond ring lying on a showcase. Y steals the ring. Both X and Y are
financially liable, and both acts are considered proximate causes.
Following the principles advocated by Dean Green 21 it might be suggested
that the essential problem is not one of causation at all, since either A's act or
B's act is sufficiently close to the result to be considered as the cause, but that
the primary inquiry should be whether the public's interest is protected against
the hazard encountered. The answer probably would be that the public is protected against the hazard of drinking poison believing it to be water, but the public is not protected against the hazard of drinking a liquid known to be poison.
The difficulty with this technique is that the question proposed is too difficult
for a jury (and sometimes too difficult for the court), and to have the court
translate causation questions into questions of public interest, and answer these
questions before submitting the case to the jury, is to revolutionize our method
of trying cases.
An approach which is more practical since it is closer to the methods of our
criminal courts because it retains the phraseology in use by them is as follows:
Granted that there are two important causes in fact, the basic problem is to
decide which is the legally significant one. The answer necessitates a consideration of the desirability of criminal responsibility considered in the light of the
interests to be served. 2 Probably, in view of the fact that the instinct of selfpreservation is one of the strongest forces in man's life, it seems to us unnatural
that one should consciously utilize the machinery of self-destruction, and that
therefore A should not be criminally responsible for homicide because he prepared for B a convenient method of self-extinction of which B was fully cognizant. In terms of result, we would say that A did not cause B's death. How
should this result be phrased in terms of cause? There are at least two methods.
We have already seen that where B drank the liquid thinking it was water,

he was considered an innocent or irresponsible agent. Thus the law evades the
argument that B's intentional act (B intended to drink the liquid) which was
the immediate cause of death was the legal cause. However, as soon as B becomes a "responsible" and "guilty" agent, we can say that his act which was

",It should be noted that since one cannot consent to a homicide, A's liability cannot be
affected by finding that B consented to A's act. CLARK, CRIiNAL LAv (3d ed. 1915) lO.
' Brower v. New York Central, etc., R. R., 91 N. J. L. i90, 1O3 At. 166 (I918)
; Hines
v. Garrett, 131 Va. 125, io8 S. E. 69o (I92i).
GREEN, op. cit. supra note 15, cc. i, 3, 4, 5, especially at pp. 59, 105, 157.
It is probably true that juries are unconsciously affected by the consideration whether
it is just to punish the defendant.
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the immediate cause of death becomes also the legal cause. We can call it an
intervening cause.
It seems preferable, however, to say that where B has full knowledge of the
facts, A's act is not the cause of but is the occasion of B's act.2 3 A has created
a condition that is acted upon by B, and the situation is very much as if A had
left a loaded gun lying on the table.
This question naturally presents itself: Why should A, having set in motion
a machinery which under ordinary circumstances would have killed B, escape
criminal responsibility for the death because of B's accidental knowledge of
A's act? It may just as easily be asked why A should escape in the situation
where he inflicts a mortal wound on B which will cause B's death in ten minutes, and after five minutes C cuts B's head off.24 The answer is that in both
cases we find that A's act was not the legal cause of B's death. The law does
not punish a man for a completed crime when his acts constitute only an attempt.
It must be remembered that the criminal law is punitive as well as preventive,
and greater punishment is meted out for actually depriving society of one of
its members than for doing an act which for any reason falls short of that end.
Since the criminal law is concerned with the mens rea and act of the defendant, it is probably true that as a matter of strict logic, a variation in the
mental state of the victim should not change the causal connection between the
defendant's act and the victim's death. However, it seems unjust to convict
the defendant of the homicide where the victim's act of suicide was deliberate,
and this result can easily be avoided by finding a lack of the requisite causal
connection. Wherever possible, causation should be treated as a purely physical
thing. In the very difficult cases, however, the approach to the problem of
cause should be from the viewpoint of the purposes to be achieved. In the
determination of legal cause in the difficult criminal cases, the element of the
desirability of criminal responsibility considered in the light of the public interests involved should be a factor.
J.M.L.
REVADUATION
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FEDERAL TAXATION-The

involved problems attendant on federal taxation have become even more intricate
through the increasing tendency of states to take over as governmental functions activities heretofore generally regarded as of a private commercial character. It would be pedantic to cite more than a few of the landmarks in constitutional law to establish the proposition that a governmental function of a
state is immune from federal taxation.
The foundation stone of the entire doctrine of tax exemption is McCulloch
v. Maryland,' which decided that a state tax on the issues of notes of the United
States Bank was void. Although the Constitution contains no express provisions that prohibit a state from taxing the instrumentalities of the federal
government, the Court reasoned that the prohibition was necessarily implied,
as the government could not maintain its sovereignty if subjected to the taxing
2 CLARK & MARSHALT, op. cit. supra note 12, § 236; see WHARTON, LAW OF HOMICIDE
(3d ed. 19o7) §§ 27, 28. The situation should be distinguished from the following case: A
has sworn to kill B the next time he sees him. B knowing this, and desiring to end his life,
deliberately confronts A who kills him. A is guilty of murder. The distinction between the

two cases is that in the poison case, the situation created by A is static, and not active.
'See People v. Ah Fat, 48 Cal. 61 (1874) ; Fisher v. State, io Lea 151 (Tenn. 1882);
cf. Caughron v. State, 99 Ark. 462, 139 S. W. 315 (igi) ; State v. Scates, 5 Jones L. 42D
(N. C. x858).
14 Wheat. 316 (1819).
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control of the states. It was here that Marshall stated his famous proposition
that the power to tax is the power to destroy.' It is to be doubted if any
judicial pronouncement has ever been quoted oftener, or has had a greater influence on subsequent decisions. We shall determine later how deserving was
Marchall's aphorism of this homage bestowed upon it.
Half a century later, it was first held in Collector v. Day 3 that a state
government instrumentality was immune from federal taxation. The Court
regarded this exemption as the necessary correlative of the immunity granted
to federal instrumentalities in the McCulloch case. It might be argued that this
correlative does not necessarily follow, inasmuch as the general government is
said to be supreme within the sphere of the powers granted it. Also the powers
granted to the national government are few in comparison with the number
reserved by the states, and consequently "the sovereignty of the former might
be effected to a considerably greater degree by a tax on a governmental instrumentality than would the sovereignty of a state. Granted that this be true,
the fact still remains that a state could not maintain an independent sovereignty
if subjected to unlimited taxation by the federal government. Since the Constitution distinctly recognizes the independent sovereignty of the states, the
Court's conclusion would seem to follow as a reasonable consequence of the
decision in the McCulloch case.
Although the doctrine is unquestioned that a governmental instrumentality
of a state is exempt from federal taxes, a limitation has been placed upon such
exemption. This modification of the rule was stated for the first time by the
Supreme Court in South Carolina v. United States.4 The State of South
Caroline was operating its own liquor dispensing system. The Court held valid
a federal tax imposed on the state for conducting that business. The rule was
rephrased to read that the exemption of state agencies and instrumentalities
from national taxation is limited to those which are of a strictly governmental
character and does not extend to those -used by the state in conducting an
ordinary "private business". The disturbing fact of this opinion is the failure
to lay down any formula by which to determine whether or not an activity is
strictly governmental in character. It did, by analogy, refer to the governmental and proprietary capacities of municipalities in the tort field, but did not
make this distinction the basis of its test, although the case is often mistakenly
cited for that proposition. What the Court did do was to introduce into the
law of federal taxation this concept of "private business", which, in indefiniteness, parallels that of the "police power" and "public policy".
The motive which prompted such a decision is obvious. The Court was
becoming alarmed at the increasing number of activities being taken over by
the states with a resultant loss of revenue to the federal government. Consequently, they approached the problem from an economic viewpoint alone, and
reached a result which is admitted to be economically meritorious. But the
distinction resorted to between "proprietary" and "governmental" activities is
wholly unsound. The analogy to municipal liability in the tort field is weakened
because the doctrine of exemption for acts of a governmental character in that
field has been seriously questioned by the Supreme Court.5 The distinction
has an even less logical basis when applied to the taxation problem, than when
2
Id. at 429.
ii Wall. 113 (0870) (tax on salary of state officer declared void).
'i99 U. S. 437, 26 Sup. Ct. nio (igo5).
Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 54o (1875) ; Workman v. New York City, 179
U. S. 552, 21 Sup. Ct. 212 (1900). Professor Borchard in an exhaustive treatment of the
problem has ably shown that the distinction even in the tort field is entirely illogical. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (924) 34 YAE L. J. I, i29, 229.
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used in the tort field. 6 The rule of exemption is not expressed in the Constitution but is implied. The reason, and it is a very cogent one indeed, which
allows an implication of such far reaching import to be drawn, is the protection of the sovereignty of the one government from destruction or impairment
at the hands of the other. This purpose can only be effected if the protection
is extended to every proper sovereign function, and what is a sovereign function in other respects must retain its nature as to taxation or else the protection
of the rule is lost. Thus in the South Carolina case the Supreme Court having
previously held that in dispensing liquor the state was engaged in a valid use
of its "police power", 7 it could not say with consistency that the federal government had the right to impose a tax on that function. In other words, the state
was making use of one of the incidents of its sovereignty, viz., the "police
power", and it had a right to do so entirely free from any control or restraint by
the national government.
This same inconsistency exists in the case of almost all the other activities
of states which have been labelled "proprietary" by the courts; for other purposes, they have been held proper sovereign functions. If the state has the
right to use eminent domain to acquire an instrumentality and has the right
to expend money raised by public taxation to carry on an activity, then that
function must be a proper sovereign function, and regardless of its nature the
federal government should not be allowed to burden that function. The courts
are constantly being called upon to determine whether or not the use of eminent
domain or the expending of money raised by taxation is proper in particular
cases. In these cases they have promulgated the rule that any function is a
sovereign one which furthers the public welfare." It follows that any function
whatsoever which furthers the public welfare should be free from taxation by
the federal government.
It is conceded that there are some activities which a state might undertake
which would not be proper sovereign functions, and therefore would not come
under the exemption. Thus if a state undertook to manufacture articles to be
used by citizens of another state or to engage in foreign trade, it would not
be engaged in furthering the welfare of its citizens; therefore those activities
would not be properly sovereign and a tax on those activities would not affect
the sovereignty of the state. But, it is repeated for emphasis' sake, the sovereignty of the state is affected by a tax on any proper sovereign function,
regardless of how proprietary that function may be.
It is worth consideration that no federal activity has ever yet been held
other than governmental, regardless of the nature of that activity. So, too, it is
thoroughly established that the public lands of the United States which are held
by it in a proprietary capacity are not taxable." If this is true of the federal
government, then likewise it should be true of the states. The rule is poor
which does not work both ways.
The discussion, so far, has assumed that Marshall's aphorism regarding
the power to tax is sound, since, with one exception, its validity has never been
judicially challenged."0 In fact, were it not for this cast iron definition from a
'That the governmental-proprietary distinction is wholly unsound for the purpose of taxation is fully established in Cohen and Dayton, Federal Taxation of State Activities and State
Taxation of Federal Activities (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 8o7.
'Vance v. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438, i8 Sup. Ct. 674 (1897).
8 See Olcott v. Supervisors, i6 Wall. 678 (1872); Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Imp. Dist.,
262 U. S. 710, 43 Sup. Ct. 694 (1923).

'Irwin v. Wright, 258 U. S. 219, 42 Sup. Ct. 293 (1922); Wisconsin Central R. R. v.
Price County, 133 U. S. 496, 10 Sup. Ct. 341 (1889) ; Lee v. Osceola Imp. Dist., 268 U. S.
643, 45 Sup. Ct. 62o (1925).
' Justice Holmes' disagreement with Marshall's proposition is quoted later in the text.
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former generation remaining fixed in the law, there would probably be no
occasion to discuss the problem, since the courts would not then be forced to
resort to the artificial distinction which they have drawn. As stated before,
the drawing of this distinction was motivated by the Court's apprehension lest
the :tates might remove valuable sources of federal revenue. This danger
exists only by virtue of the concept of "power" which Marshall introduced
into the law. He reasoned that if the power to tax existed at all, there could
be no restraint whatsoever exercised upon that power save the will of the one
exercising the power. His Federalist mind could not conceive of distinctions
in degree where a "power" was concerned, and the Court adopted his reasoning
in toto. Starting with this premise, the necessary alternative, of course, was
to deny the power to tax altogether when a governmental instrumentality was
concerned. It was to escape the economically unsatisfactory results of this
conclusion that the courts felt forced to declare some state activities not to be
governmental.
The distinction made was not only an improper one, but was a totally
unnecessary one as well. A careful re-examination of the entire problem of
governmental taxation discloses that the conclusion expressed in Marshall's
aphorism is not a valid one. The realization of this fact will enable the Court
to find a ready solution to the problem in which they will be applying the reason
which caused the implication of exemption to be drawn, and at the same time
attain a result which, even from the revenue viewpoint, will be much more
satisfactory. Mr. Justice Holmes, in one of his dissenting opinions, clearly
shows the error of Marshall's conception. He refers to
the effect of certain dicta of Chief Justice Marshall which
..
culminated in or rather was founded upon his often-quoted proposition
that the power to tax is the power to destroy. In those days it was not
recognized as it is today that most of the distinctions of law are distinctions of degree. If the state had any power it was assumed that they had
all the power, and that the necessary alternative was to deny it altogether.
But this Court which has so often defeated the attempt to tax in certain
ways can defeat an attempt to discriminate or otherwise go too far without
wholly abolishing the power to tax. The power to tax is not the power to
destroy while this Court sits. The power to fix rates is the power to destroy
if unlimited but this Court while it endeavors to prevent confiscation does
not prevent the fixing of rates. A tax is not an unconstitutional regulation
in every case where an absolute prohibition of sales would be one." 11
It is not necessary to add anything further to this forceful argument to
show that the power to tax is not the power to destroy. This being so, no tax
would be invalid merely because it was laid on a state instrumentality, but only
those federal taxes would be prohibited which actually did burden or impair
the sovereignty of a state. The same rule would apply to state taxes on federal
instrumentalities. The Court should not attempt to formulate a general rule
denying the power of one sovereignty to tax an instrumentality of the other,
but the question in each case should be a specific one, limited to the particular
exercise of taxing power in issue. As Mr. Justice Strong said in speaking of
state taxes:
"It is, therefore, manifest that exemption of Federal agencies from
state taxation is dependent, not upon the nature of the agents, or upon the
mode of their constitution, or upon the fact that they are agents, but upon
the effect of the tax; that is upon the question whether the tax does in
"1 Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 223, 48 Sup. Ct. 451, 453 (1928).
inserted.)

(Italics
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truth deprive them, to serve the government as they were intended to serve
it or does hinder the efficient use of their power." 12
The conclusion is, then, that the validity of each tax, entirely independent
of the subject matter, should depend only upon whether or not it is a burden
upon or does impair the state's exercise of a sovereign function. It would be
for the Court to say in each case whether or not the tax is burdensome. This
is a proper judicial function, and one which the courts are constantly being
called upon to exercise in determining whether or not a state tax is a burden on
interstate commerce.
A tax levied on property or an activity of a state which would have to be
paid out of the state's treasury would of course be burdensome and invalid.
However, where the state engages in an activity from which the returns are
greater than the expenditures required to carry on that activity, so that the tax
in fact comes out of those returns, then the state's conduct of that activity is
not affected by the tax, and to tax such activity is not improper. Similarly, no
non-discriminatory tax paid by an individual would be burdensome on the state.
The rule herein formulated can perhaps best be illustrated by applying it to
situations already considered by the Supreme Court. In the South Carolina
case we should agree with the Court, that the tax was valid-not because the
state was engaged in a proprietary activity (that fact not affecting the state's
right to exercise its sovereignty unimpaired), but because there was actually
no burden on the state. The returns from the liquor dispensing system showed
a considerable profit over and above the money expended in conducting the
business. The tax could have been paid out of the returns from the business
and a profit would still have remained. Therefore, the control over the manner
of conducting the business was not affected. This result, which is the same as
the Court's, is equally meritorious from an economic standpoint, and can be
reached without resorting to any fanciful distinctions which have no basis in fact.
In addition to the distinction drawn between "proprietary" and "governmental" capacities of states, there are numerous other examples in which the
Court, in order to arrive at an economically feasible result, has engaged in
mental gymnastics strikingly illogical. Thus, there are cases permitting indirect
taxation of a governmental instrumentality where direct taxation has been declared invalid, even though the burden seems to be just as real in the cases
allowed as where the tax is condemned. Examples of this are those cases in
which a tax is denied upon that part of the capital of a corporation which is
invested in governmental securities but is allowed on the franchise of the corporation measured by its capital, even though part of that capital be invested
in exempt securities. 13 Professor Powell very aptly labels the distinction thus:

Railroad Company v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 36 (1874).
'Home Ins. Co. v. New York State, 134 U. S.594, 20 Sup. Ct. 593 (890o) ; Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co., 22o U. S. l07, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (91).
The Court further complicated the problem by drawing another distinction in Macallen
Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U. S.620, 49 Sup. Ct. 432 (1929), where the validity of the tax was
made dependent upon the intent of the legislature, and even though the tax was on a privilege,
it was held invalid because the legislature in fact really intended to make the non-taxable
measure the subject of the tax. Note (1931) 79 U. oF PA. L. REv. 948 makes an analysis
of the cases drawing this distinction between the subject and measure and points out that the
result is reached through "logical illogicality".
Taxes are also permitted upon stockholders of corporations owning governmental securities, with the result that the stockholders usually pay a larger tax than would be the case if
the corporation did not own these exempt securities. Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Wall.
573 (1865) ; see also Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, 184 U. S. II, 22 Sup. Ct. 394 (902).
Subject to taxation also are bequests to municipalities, Snyder v. Bettman, 19o U. S. 249,
23 Sup. Ct. 8o3 (29o3) ; death transfer of exempt securities, United States v. Perkins, 163
U. S.625, 16 Sup. Ct. lO73 (1896) ; profits derived from the sale of municipal bonds, Willcutts v. Bun,

282 U. S. 216,

51 Sup. Ct. 125 (1932).
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"The difference between the tax on the capital of a corporation and a
tax on its franchise measured by its capital is the difference between
tweedledum and tweedledee." 14
Here the Court has succeeded, through the distinction employed, in obtaining
a solution economically sound, but as in most of the cases in which they have
so succeeded, the results are more commendable than the reasoning by which
they were obtained. Applying the rule herein suggested, this unwarranted distinction would be eliminated, and any tax on governmental securities, either
state or federal, would be held valid unless, of course, it were discriminatory.
It is an economic truism that a tax which does not discriminate against governmental securities is not a burden upon the government issuing those securities,
while on the other hand, to invalidate such a tax is to give a bounty to a favored
few investors. Where, of course, the tax discriminates against the government
securities, as in the McCulloch case, it is clearly invalid.
At the last term by a five to four decision, the Supreme Court in Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co.'5 held that the lessee's income from the sale of oil and
gas produced under lease of state school lands was not taxable by the federal
government, since the lease constituted an instrumentality of the state. On an
identical set of facts, save that one was in Texas and the other in Oklahoma,
an unanimous Court had, but a year before in Oil Corporationv. Bass,'8 decided
that the tax was valid. The majority in the Burnet case attempted to distinguish the cases on the ground that the leases are construed in Texas as sales
of the oil and gas in place, and consequently the tax attached only after the
interest of the state had ceased. But the practical effect of the tax as a burden
on the state sovereignties was the same. Here is a striking illustration of the
inconsistencies to which the Court is forced by its present blind adherence to
Marshall's dictum. Both of these taxes should be declared valid as neither is
really a burden upon the state.
In another very recent case, a lower court has held valid an import tax on
scientific equipment which the University of Illinois imported for use in its
laboratories.Y7 The majority opinion in this case, while intimating that the
university was a "proprietary" instrumentality, gave as its reason for holding
the tax valid, the power of Congress to regulate commerce. Disregarding the
last point, a tax on a state university should not be allowed as this is a real
burden upon the state, there being no profit derived from the enterprise. However, a tax upon admission tickets to football games, in which a state university
team participates, is entirely different, as the tax is paid by the spectator, and
no burden occurs to the state.'" So, too, a tax upon the salary of a government
employee should be upheld, notwithstanding Collector v. Day. The Court must
" Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority 'by the"Taxing Powers of the
States (I919) 32 HARv. L. Rxv. 902, 915.
'285 U. S. 393, 52 Sup. Ct. 443 (1932).
"283 U. S. 279, 51 Sup. Ct. 81 (1931).
17Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. United States, (C. C. P. A.) U. S.
1932, at 782.

Daily, June 25,

It is amusing to note that the Bureau of Internal Revenue has ruled such a tax valid,
while various state attorney generals have advised their state universities that the tax is
invalid. The lack of any bright line of demarcation between what is governmental and what
is proprietary has been the source of much conflict between the Bureau and the various state
governments. The question is becoming such a frequent source of litigation that President
Hoover is contemplating the appointment of a commission to study the whole relationship of
federal and state taxing powers. The National Association of Attorney Generals will also
make an extensive study of the same problem in connection with this committee in an effort
to obtain some formula to guide future legislation and judicial decisions. See U. S. Daily,
October 12, 1932, at 1467.
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remember in seeking a panacea for these perplexing problems that taxation is
the very "life blood" of a government. As said in Nicol v. Ames:
"The power to tax is the one great power upon which the whole
national fabric is based. It is as necessary to the existence and prosperity
of a nation as is the air he breathes to the natural man. It is not only the
power to destroy, but it is also the power to keep alive." 19
The solution here suggested provides a line of demarcation which is satisfactory in that it secures to the federal and state governments a considerable
source of revenue and at the same time recognizes their several sovereignties.
The problem would be much simplified if it were not for the doctrine of stare
decisis. However, inasmuch as there is no express prohibition in the Constitution, and none of the law on this subject is statutory, but simply a judgemade rule of convenience, there should be no hesitation to discard that part
which has no basis in logic or in fact, and is no longer even convenient. It is
too much to expect that in one sweep the Court will discard all of its traditional,
though illogical, fancies. But at least we can hope that the advance made
during the last term will continue, and that eventually the wisdom of Justice
Holmes' reasoning will prevail upon the majority, thereby assuring results
which are sound, legally, politically and economically.
W. C. W.

'73 U. S. 5o9 at 515, i9 Sup. Ct. 522 at 525 (1899).

